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1.  Introduction 
The recent uprisings and political upheavals across the North African and Middle Eastern 
region, collectively referred to as the Arab Spring (BBC news, 2011) have focussed 
worldwide attention on institutions at a state-level on the process of economic and social 
stagnation and societal change.  While there has been a considerable amount of media 
interest on topics related to excessive salaries, compensation packages and performance 
related bonuses of wealthy corporate elites during the recent financial crisis, board level 
remuneration excesses have long been a topic of interest in developing world with alleged 
corporate corruption amounting to as much as US$ 148 billion a year stifling industrial and 
economic growth across Africa (BBC news, 2006).  However much of the research literature 
regarding this topic is concentrated on single country studies, and primarily OECD nations 
such as US, UK, Germany and Japan (for example, see Conyon (1997); Cosh and Hughes 
(1997); Conyon and Peck (1998) and Shen (2003)), and focussed on either CEO or executive 
compensation.  However the dominance of these measures largely overshadows a broader 
aggregate board remuneration level that takes into account of firms falling within extended 
business or family networks, common to much of developing world (Claessens et al, 1999, 
2000).  Equally there is considerable variation in institutional quality across much of the 
developing world with this being reflected across North Africa and with particular relevance 
in wake of Arab Spring (Transparency International website, 2011).  Consequently I am 
motivated to study the impact of institutional quality on aggregate board remuneration using 
six well established World Bank governance institutional quality measures, corruption 
control, government effectiveness, political stability and absence from terrorism, regulatory 
control, rule of law and democratic voice and accountability (World Bank Governance, 2012). 
 Firms undergoing initial primary offerings (IPOs) provide a unique opportunity to 
study the agency implications arising from the diversification of ownership to minority 
outsider shareholders for the first time in the focal firm’s lifecycle (Fama (1980); Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)).  As such agency theory in its broadest sense is associated with the 
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alignment of motivational differences (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) between various 
incumbent insider management (agents) and minority outsider owners (principals).  
Consequently its prescriptions tend to focus on the incentive alignment of insider agents with 
external principals through executive compensation packages, as well as monitoring of 
insiders through the optimal structure of boards of directors.  This latter monitoring role 
infers a separation of roles of CEO and chairman as well as the proportion of nonexecutive 
directors and their degree of independence from dominant insider groups, such as the CEO.  
However the study of board remuneration in a multi-country setting underscores the 
importance of the role of institutions that act to regulate human behaviour and influence 
decision-making.  Institutional theory seeks to establish the “rules of the game” through 
which all social and economic behaviour across a society is shaped.  As such institutions 
have a fundamentally important role in shaping incentive alignment and in facilitating and 
supporting the role of monitoring, which are central tenets of agency theory.  Consequently I 
adopt a combination of institutional and agency theories to elaborate on the role of these 
perspectives in shaping optimal incentive alignment and in curbing excessive self-reward or 
expropriation at board level. 
 I use two measures of aggregate board compensation, the fixed base salary disclosed 
in IPO listings filings, and a total remuneration measure that takes into account the initial 
base salary as well as income derived from individual equity holdings in firm and additional 
stated perks.  This is based on a unique and comprehensive hand-collected sample of 78 IPO 
firms from across North Africa that listed between 2000 and 2012.  I use the six well-
established World Bank governance measures, namely corruption control, government 
effectiveness, political stability and absence from violence, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and voice and accountability, as a proxy of institutional quality.  I find that government 
effectiveness, defined as independence of civil service from political pressure alongside its 
credibility and effectiveness in designing and executing policy, is closely associated with 
reigning in excessive self-rewarding behaviour of boards.  In addition enhanced corruption 
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control measures are associated with more conservative board’s base salary.  A surprising 
finding is enhanced rule of law is related to increases in board compensation.  In terms of 
disclosure of individual executive salaries (a measure of informational transparency and 
protection of informational property rights) and I find that political stability is closely 
associated with enhanced disclosure.  However a further unexpected finding is that lower 
voice and accountability is associated with increased likelihood of disclosure inferring firms 
in poor quality informational environments are more likely to adopt international best 
practice transparency measures to counter for state-level institutional deficiencies. 
 I proceed as follows.  In next section I outline theoretical concepts while section 3 
outlines justification of hypotheses.  Section 4 discusses data and nuances of north African 
business environment while section 5 discusses empirical methods.  Section 6 discusses 
results and final section concludes. 
 
2.  Conceptual framework 
The theoretical antecedents to the study are drawn principally from a combination of agency 
and institutional perspectives.  This combination facilitates insights beyond the reach of a 
single perspective which is particularly applicable in a multi-country comparative 
institutional setting, such as that across North Africa, which is typical of much of developing 
world in having considerable incongruity between formal and informal institutions. 
 The agency theoretical perspective has its recent origins in the inaugural work of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) and primarily focusses on the dual role of 
incentives and monitoring in order to align motivations between insider incumbent 
management (otherwise known as agents) and minority outsider legal owners (referred to as 
principals).  However while Fama (1980) dispenses of the earlier analogy of agency cost 
resulting from a divestment of ownership by an entrepreneurial founder within a firm which 
is central to Jensen and Meckling (1976) in preference of a view of the focal firm as a legal 
entity encompassing a nexus of contracts, a fundamental assumption behind both are notions 
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of efficient markets in risk capital, labour and factors of production.  These in particular 
underscore the perspectives advanced in Fama (1980) that boards of directors have a primary 
function in providing a lower-cost mechanism for exerting internal discipline (re-ordering 
and replacement of under-performing incumbent management) than the external market for 
corporate control (exercised through threat of takeovers by rival firms).  An explicit 
assumption in this perspective is that of efficient markets for equity risk capital as well as 
assumptions derived from earlier work of Alchian (1969) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
regarding active markets for managerial labour both inside and outside the focal firm.  Fama 
and Jensen (1983) argue that competitive markets for outside directors in particular 
underscore their incentives to reign in corporate excesses and act as better monitors of 
corporate earnings management.  This is also reflected in Dechow et al (1996) and Beasley 
(1996) where findings from US sample provide evidence that outside directors are effective 
in preventing earnings frauds.  However all of these views are centred on the notion of 
competitive external labour markets for outside directors.  Assumptions of efficient risk 
capital markets are core to agency theory, where minority outside investors are assumed to be 
able to diversify risks arising from holding any single firm in efficient and liquid capital 
markets.  Their consequent distance from focal firm underscores the need for effective 
monitoring of agent entities so as to dissuade these from accessing non-pecuniary private 
benefits of control at their expense (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 The focus of agency theory on the role of director compensation as an incentive to 
align motivations of insider agents with those of external principals typically focus on the 
remuneration of CEOs or executive directors (see for example Core et al (1999); Conyon and 
Peck (1998); Conyon (1997); Cosh and Hughs (1997)).  These typically study the impact of 
various agency theoretically related board governance measures on executive compensation 
and are focussed on large, well developed OECD risk capital markets of US and UK.  
However a distinct strand of the executive compensation literature focusses on the optimal 
design of managerial agent compensation contracts.  This is derived from agency perspective 
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prescriptions of stimulating management agents to adopt a more entrepreneurial mentality, 
similar to that envisaged by Jensen and Mecking (1976), where individual compensatory 
rewards are closely linked to the fortunes of the wider firm.  However individual managerial 
agents are generally risk-averse and thus more likely to take decisions to minimise the risks 
to their own personal compensation at the detriment of potential value-maximisation 
envisaged as entrepreneurial culture in agency theory (Harris and Raviv, 1979).  The 
evidence from several well established studies such as Harris and Raviv (1979), Holmstrom 
(1979) and Grosman and Hart (1983) argue the benefits in stimulating value-maximizing 
decision-taking by managerial agents when their compensation is linked to some degree to 
wider firm value.  However studies such as Paul (1992) and Sloan (1993) provide cautionary 
indications as to the relationship between the optimal decision-making processes incentivized 
in management and the relative proportion of compensation that is equity-based in contrast to 
its fixed cash component.  Finally Mehran (1995) finds evidence that board composition, in 
terms of insider-associated versus outsider nonexecutives, is linked to the proportion of 
equity-based compensation in relation to its fixed cash counterpart.  Higher proportions of 
outsider (independent) nonexecutives are associated with higher proportions of equity-based 
pay while the opposite is true of insider-associated nonexecutives who are deemed more 
responsive to the risk-aversive nature of incumbent insider managerial agents. 
However a core assumption permeating agency related executive compensation 
studies and incentives is that of efficient and competitive managerial labour markets.  This in 
itself has led to the evolution of theories such as those of human capital (Harris and Helfat, 
1997) and managerial discretion (Oxelheim and Randoy (2005); Sanders and Carpenter 
(1998); Finkelstein and Boyd (1998)) that focus on supply-side and demand-side factor 
influencing salary levels and additional salary premiums for CEOs and executives.  These 
extend the basic concepts embodied in agency while providing greater emphasis on the 
competitive role of market-orientated salary packages.  This concept of a readily accessible, 
efficient and integrated market for managerial labour is also a core assumption in explaining 
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transitions in executive compensatory arrangements involved in privatizations of former state 
owned enterprises (SOEs), which is particularly common phenomenon in Egypt and to a 
lesser extent other Maghreb countries, and has led to a significant number of IPOs.  Cragg 
and Dyck (2000) attribute factors causing segmentation in managerial labour market, and 
thus in market-determined compensation, in the UK from 1970 to 1981 as being a 
combination of low-incentives for monitoring of SOEs, limited managerial discretion and 
severe political constraints on pay-setting in SOE firms.  Upon privatization and the removal 
of these characteristic wedges, the source of segmentation was lost and managerial labour 
market attained a degree of integration with the consequence that pay was equilibrated to the 
supply and demand forces in commercial market for managerial labour with the focus on 
firms being able to set salary levels akin to the recruitment of most talented executives.  
However in practice these assumptions are at best untenable in much of the developing world, 
and in particular in North Africa, given the extreme narrowness of formal economic sectors, 
often dominated by a handful of extractive or agricultural industries, and political economies 
dominated by social elites disinterested in enacting reforms owing to these initiating more 
equitable distribution of wealth across society thereby inferring a substantial loss accruing to 
their state-level private benefits of control (North, 1990).  As such almost non-existent 
managerial labour markets combined with significant labour migration drains human and 
social resources from economies (Quintyn and Taylor, 2005) underscoring national 
managerial labour markets that are largely segmented from competitive pressures in rest of 
world. 
 Institutional theory primarily focusses on the origins of institutions and their role in 
shaping transactions costs and the “rules of the game”.  These are formed from the interplay 
between informal institutions, such as social norms and values that are commonly embodied 
in religion and culture (Williamson, 2000), as well as their formal counterparts, which are the 
legal, judicial, political and governmental apparatus, that govern on-going day-to-day 
transactions within a society (Williamson (2000); North (1989, 1990)).  The institutional 
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environment of North Africa is similar to much of the developing world with nations defined 
by narrow polity’s dominated by social elites, often empowered at independence from 
primarily European colonial metropoles, together with legal and judicial systems 
characterised by incomplete and inefficient supportive bureaucratic infrastructure in the civil 
code law legal and judicial process (Joireman, 2001, 2006).  Further significant impediments 
across North Africa arose from the disenfranchisement of wider population during colonial 
period with social and economic affairs of the majority being governed by classical Islamic 
shari’ya law across North Africa (Hearn (2011); Kuran (2004)).  These informal institutions 
are notable in engendering very different social and economic outcomes from the common 
and civil law based European systems.  In particular classical Islamic shari’ya law is rooted 
firmly in concepts of partnership and risk-sharing (Hearn et al, 2012).  Furthermore the 
wholesale subsuming of informal institutions in favour of the at least nominal universal 
adoption of legal, political and governmental systems inherited from European colonial 
metropoles further underscored the narrowness of political economies often dominated by a 
handful of social elites.  This is particularly prevalent in Algeria which was considered an 
integral part of France itself until independence.  These have significant private benefits of 
control at state-level with substantial roles for authoritarian military involvement and support 
and an extended role for government in the light of a very weak external contracting 
environment and paucity in protection of property rights.  This in turn infers very high 
transactions costs which inhibit efficient markets for risk capital that are a core assumption of 
much of the agency theory literature in terms of minority outsider investors ability to 
effectively diversify risk.  Furthermore the extremely narrow political economies, common 
across much of North Africa, infers a minimal, even non-existent, competitive market for 
managerial labour with the extremely high transactions costs prevalent in societies only 
mitigated by an equally dense network of social ties amongst the elites in political control.  
This institutional context questions the applicability of traditional agency theory related firm-
governance measures, such as the role and ability of independent nonexecutives in curbing 
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director excesses in terms of self-reward.  Furthermore it questions the role of salary in being 
a premium of sorts in attracting and incentivizing insiders and managerial agents to align 
their motives to those of outsider principals.  Consequently the narrowness of political 
economies, dominated by social elites, together with inadequate markets for corporate 
control and managerial labour, provides an ideal laboratory within which to explore the 
impact of institutional environment as well as agency theory related board controls on 
director compensation, or self-rewarding behaviour. 
 
3.  Hypothesis development 
In order to study the impact of institutional development on levels of board compensation we 
develop hypotheses based on the application of six well established World Bank governance 
institutional quality measures as introduced in Kaufman et al (2009).  These build on the 
evidence from Doidge et al (2007) underscoring the importance of state-level macro-
institutional environment over and above that of firm-level governance in terms of the focal 
firm’s ability to access external capital markets.  As such institutional improvements are 
argued to facilitate external capital markets and an enhanced market for corporate control 
while at same time promoting greater transparency in disclosures and improved access to 
better functioning legal and judicial systems for minority investors thereby reducing ex-ante 
agency costs associated with investment. 
 The institutional theoretical lens forwarded by Williamson (2002) and North (1989, 
1994) is underscored by the concept of path dependence and trajectory in economies which is 
based on the societal matrix of informal and formal institutions.  In particular North (1989) 
characterises the highly bureaucratic nature of Latin America’s political economies 
underscoring the centralisation of political and economic power in the hands of an extremely 
narrow group of social elites.  These attain their considerable influence over state machinery 
through institutions inherited from the Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal which promote the 
excessive centralisation of state authority and relegation of individual notions of property 
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rights to those of the state.  This is equally particularly true of formal institutions developed 
by Napoleonic France and transplanted worldwide principally through colonial conquest.  
The relegation of individual property rights over that of the state also underscores the more 
general relegation of judiciary to a more administrative role across civil code law countries 
(see La Porta et al (1999, 2008)) attributed to a lack of independence of judiciary and law-
making process from the national executive.  Rajan and Zingales (2003) and North (1994) 
argue that the entrenched interests and private benefits of control of social elites infer 
minimal support for genuine reform of societal institutional matrices to engender more 
equitable social and economic outcomes.  Given the notions of tacit support for centralised 
authority and relative apathy towards rights of individual in civil code law countries 
promoted by state governmental apparatus the institutions formed from this matrix will likely 
have a distinct impact on ex-ante alignment of interests between principals (owners) and 
agents (incumbent management) within a firm.  As such institutions formed in such an 
environment, and prone to greater corruption of state machinery by social elites, are less 
likely to promote optimal ex-ante incentives (salary) and more likely to engender 
expropriation thus leading to elevated agency cost.  Equally institutions formed on corruption 
of state apparatus by social elites are less likely to promote optimal informational disclosure, 
including that of individual director salaries, as this would otherwise provide minority 
outside investors with informational recourse to address potential expropriation by dominant 
insider groups within firms.  Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested: 
 
Hypothesis 1a.  Control of corruption is negatively associated with IPO-firm board 
compensation 
Hypothesis 1b.  Control of corruption is positively associated with likelihood of individual 
salary disclosure 
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Following from institutional perspective and the ability of state machinery, defined as 
government and civil service, to formulate and implement credible policies that independent 
of the interests of the executive or the influence of dominant social elites is closely associated 
with the notion of state machinery and wider political economy having broad constituency 
and representation across population.  As such institutional theory of North (1989, 1994) and 
Williamson (1999, 2008) infers that governments and state machinery that have narrow 
constituency and are subject to significant influence of social elites are less likely to 
implement policies engendering social and economic outcomes that are genuinely equitable 
in nature and in interests of wider society rather than centralised interests of social elites.  
Consequently the capture of state policy-making machinery (government and civil service) 
by social elites with vested interests is closely associated to minimal and inequitable reforms 
being undertaken and a negative impact on the path trajectory (development) of political 
economy and institutional fabric of society.  As such the independence of state machinery 
from executive and its enhanced credibility and commitment to genuinely equitable policy 
formulation is a key element in reducing agency costs within firms associated with 
differences in interests between minority outside principals and incumbent managerial agents 
in firms.  This is particularly true in the light that institutional reform that itself forms the 
wider path dependence of societal matrices is a reflexive process based on shaping the 
outcome of an infinite number of transactions within an economy.  As such the effectiveness 
of state machinery in independent policy formulation is closely associated to societal 
institutional development and reduction in agency costs through optimal incentive alignment.  
Similarly this reduced agency cost infers lower risks of expropriation and improved 
protection of minority investors informational property rights.  Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis 2a.  Government effectiveness is negatively associated with IPO-firm board 
compensation 
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Hypothesis 2b.  Government effectiveness is positively associated with likelihood of 
individual salary disclosure 
 
The institutional perspective advanced by North (1989, 1994) also advocates that the lack of 
political stability across many civil code law Latin American countries and propensity for 
civil war and violent uprising is in accordance to the considerable vested interests of social 
elite groups and their disinterest in effecting more equitable social and economic reforms that 
would cause a loss to their private benefits of control.  This institutional inertia and resulting 
detrimental impact on path trajectories of economies and institutional development results in 
further disenfranchising wider population leading to an increased probability of violent 
overthrow and political turbulence the only recourse for wider population to instigate 
political change.  As such institutional theory views political stability as being reflective of 
the background structure of political economy, narrowness of polity, and dominance of state 
machinery by special interest groups.  These institutional characteristics are less likely to 
engender optimal incentive alignment (and resulting reduction of agency cost) between 
principals and agents within firms, with these being dominated by commercial elites drawn 
from same special interest groups.  This would be reflected in higher risks of expropriation 
and board self-rewarding tendencies in conjunction with a deterioration in protection of 
informational property rights for minority investors.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
tested: 
 
Hypothesis 3a.  Political stability and absence from terrorism is negatively associated with 
IPO-firm board compensation 
Hypothesis 3b.  Political Stability is positively associated with likelihood of individual 
salary disclosure 
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While institutional theory views narrow political economies dominated by the vested 
interests of social elites in hindering equitable institutional reform or effective policy making 
and enactment, North (1994) and Collier (2010) argue that a natural counterbalance to these 
vested interests arises from a thriving private sector.  In particular a strong private sector has 
the ability to challenge the institutional stagnation created by vested interests of the central 
executive.  Furthermore Collier (2010) argues that a thriving private sector is essential in 
providing checks and balances supporting more equitable reform and excesses of centralised 
state that arise through systems defined by patronage and cronyism.  As such the ability of 
government to effect policies promoting effective competition in private sector which avoid 
the capture of industries by special interest groups with considerable private benefits of 
control is essential ultimately in achieving a state with a broad constituency able to support 
effectively enforced property rights.  The following hypotheses is tested: 
 
Hypothesis 4a.  Regulatory quality is negatively associated with IPO-firm director 
compensation 
Hypothesis 4b.  Regulatory quality is positively associated with likelihood of individual 
salary disclosure 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert the principle foundation of agency cost in being rooted in 
the misalignment of interests between principals and agents which is caused by the latter in 
pursuing self-interested goals (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) at the expense of the former.  
Equally the agency theory perspective views contract specification and effective enforcement 
alongside incentives as necessary prerequisites to reducing agency costs.  In particular 
judiciaries that are independent of the executive and special interest groups (North, 1994) 
together with substantial bodies of supportive case law, in common law countries or an 
efficient supportive bureaucracy in civil code law countries (Joireman, 2001), such as North 
African region, are essential for effective protection of property rights (Djankov et al, 2003).  
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This provides minority outside investors with legal recourse in event of expropriation.  
However a critical feature of such ability to protect property rights through efficient courts is 
protection and enforcement of access of investors to information through accurate firm 
disclosures.  Consequently the following hypotheses is tested: 
 
Hypothesis 5a.  Rule of Law is negatively associated with IPO-firm director compensation 
Hypothesis 5b.  Rule of law is positively associated with likelihood of individual salary 
disclosure 
 
North (1989, 1994) argues that the evolutionary development and path trajectory of societies 
and economies is largely underscored on the shape of the indigenous societies polity 
(political economy) and capture of state machinery by vested interest groups or social elites.  
As such institutional environments formed from political and governmental apparatus with 
broad constituency across wider population that engender notions of democracy and 
inclusivity that are supported through extensive checks and balances, such as an active 
private sector, and more likely to support effective institutions to mitigate agency costs 
within societies transactions.  Equally a significant part of broader constituency checks and 
balances against excesses of executive or vested interest groups is active media, unhindered 
by influence by executive, together with freedom of expression and association that 
facilitates societies ability to question decision-making of executive and propose equitable 
reforms.  As such freedom of association and expression across society alongside media 
freedom can be viewed as part of wider checks and balances of democratic system in a 
society in reigning-in potential expropriation and enhancing levels of disclosure through 
enhanced firm-level scrutiny (Hope, 2003)).  Therefore the following hypotheses are tested: 
 
Hypothesis 6a.  Voice & Accountability is negatively associated with IPO-firm director 
compensation 
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Hypothesis 6b.  Voice & Accountability is positively associated with likelihood of 
individual salary disclosure 
 
4.  Data and Maghreb business environment 
4.1  Data 
The dataset constructed and used in this paper represent a comprehensive list of all IPOs 
undertaken on each of the national stock exchanges of the North African region, namely 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia for the period 2000 and 2012.  The evidence in Table 1 
reveals that listing activity is sporadic owing to the smaller size of these markets with large 
periods of inactivity such as between 2000 and 2005 in Egypt and 2000 and 2004 in Morocco.  
The smallest of the exchanges, Algeria, has failed to attract any listings since the period 
immediate following its inception in 1999/2000.  However in this case alone I include the 
additional two listings prior to 2000 given the small and static nature of this market.  Tunisia 
in contrast has had a very small but steady stream of listings over the sample period. 
Table 1 
 
 Flotation prospectuses were hand-collected from financial market regulator websites 
for Algeria and for Morocco while a combination of Thomson Corporation Perfect 
Information and Al Zawya databases were used to source Egyptian prospectuses.  Al Zawya 
database, the national stock exchange and direct contact with individual firms were used to 
source prospectuses for Tunisia.  We exclude readmissions and transfers of listings between 
main and development boards while also excluding demergers, reorganizations and flotations 
of preferred stock, convertibles, unit and investment trusts.  Consequently our final sample is 
composed of 78 IPO firms that floated ordinary shares with single class voting rights 
between 2000 and 2012.  Share prices were obtained from Bloomberg, DataStream and Al 
Zawya as well as direct from the national stock exchange in Algeria.  US$ Exchanges rates 
were obtained from Bloomberg. 
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 Considerable care was taken in the interpretation of information from IPO listings 
prospectuses given the considerable variation in size and quality of these filings across the 
continent (see Hearn (2013a) for detailed discussion on this issue).  Attempts to verify data 
from prospectuses with additional sources such as firm websites, annual reports and 
mandatory filings of annual accounts were taken where possible.  The declaration of board 
compensation in Egypt’s Ghabbour Auto firm is one such example of successful additional 
verification, where the total value, in numerical millions, was stated alongside units, also 
denominated in millions, equating to a total figure in billions or even trillions.  Following 
additional verification with firm’s annual reports the value used here is in millions. 
 
4.2  Maghreb business environment 
The pervasive influence of extended family control within the region is reflect in sizeable 
ownership stakes across approximately one third of sample group as is evident in Appendix 
Table 1.  This provides strong evidence that the role of family is more than circumstantial.  It 
is also notable that the highest levels of self-rewarding behaviour, revealed in director total 
remuneration measures, are prevalent in Egypt and Tunisia with levels being lower in 
Morocco.  This in part is likely to be reflective that family firms in Morocco are smaller in 
nature and attracted to listing on Casablanca bourse by a range of tax breaks and concessions 
mediated as part of a determined marketing scheme orchestrated by the bourse to boost 
otherwise inactive exchange listings (Hearn, 2010).  In contrast listed family firms in Egypt 
are more commonly associated with firms that were established by large families, were then 
subject to nationalization under the socialist political regime of General Abdul Nasser, only 
for families to more recently reassert controlling ownership over their former assets.  As such 
many of these Egyptian IPO firms are moribund former state-controlled enterprises complete 
with cumbersome bureaucratic management systems that have reverted to concentrated 
family control inferring that there is considerable potential for expropriation and self-
rewarding behaviour as these firms lack the levels of control permeating through their 
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structure of conventional family firms in markets such as Morocco.  Claessens et al (2000) 
attribute the often considerable separation of ownership (defined in terms of concentrated 
cash flow rights) to control (voting rights) in firms within extended family networks across 
East Asia to increased likelihood of expropriation.  Even when multiple classes of shares are 
not present other significant means of exerting control are through extensive networks of 
cross-shareholdings by other firms affiliate to the family or business network, shared 
common directors across boards of networked firms.  However evidence regarding the 
prevalence of private benefits of control within family as opposed to non-family firms can be 
seen from Figure 1.  This reveals that the largest private benefits of control are attributed to 
family firms in Algeria, then Egypt before decreasing to Tunisia and Morocco. 
Figure 1 
 
5.  Empirical methods and variables 
5.1  Variables 
5.1.1  Dependent variables: director compensation measures 
We adopt two measures of aggregate director compensation.  The first, being fixed base 
salary, is the aggregate total of cash remuneration to the board.  This is stated in IPO listings 
prospectuses either as a single aggregate value or as a sum of stated individual amounts 
attributable to each director.  It also includes cash sitting fees, also known as “jetons de 
presence” in Francophone countries, for nonexecutive directors.  Nonexecutives are included 
in the aggregate board fixed base salary value owing to the significant differences in 
corporate governance across North Africa, which largely mirrors differences across wider 
developing world.  In particular firms that are subordinate members of large extended 
business groups or family networks have the control and domination of their affairs, that 
would be normally attributable to a CEO in Anglo-American shareholder value system, 
vested through the Chairman or nonexecutive entities with the CEO and executive directors 
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being viewed more as a hired management team.  This structure is especially common in 
Nigeria as well as being prevalent across remainder of Africa (Hearn and Piesse, 2013). 
 The second measure is that of aggregate board total remuneration.  This includes the 
fixed base salary cash component of compensation and additionally evaluates the total of 
individual directors additional personal income derived from dividends on stock ownership 
in focal firm as well as the stated value of equity options and derivatives, performance-
related bonuses and additional income in form of items such as social club membership fees, 
accommodation and housing costs and travel expenses.  As such this total remuneration 
measure is a more all-encompassing measure providing a conservative estimate at the full 
director income derived from focal firm.  It should be noted that the use of performance-
related bonuses is minimal across Africa while the use of equity options and derivatives as 
incentive-based compensation is extremely rare, mirroring a lack of established derivatives 
markets across the continent with sole exception being South Africa.  As such equity options 
are only used in a very small handful of IPO firms in Egypt.  This second total remuneration 
measure of compensation captures both a degree of additional equity-risk incentive structure, 
inferred from agency perspective, as well as being viewed as a measure of board-level 
compensatory self-reward, also acknowledged in agency terms.  The conservative nature of 
estimate follows the assertion of Dyck and Zingales (2004) that private benefits of control are 
intrinsically difficult to quantify as a controlling party will only extract resources when it is 
difficult to prove this is the case. 
 Both measures of compensation are natural logarithmically transformed.  This is in 
line with literature (Core et al, 1999) as well as adhering to common practice in human 
resource consultancy “guide charts” where this is usually related to the logarithm of firm size 
which in this case is the log of firm revenues.  Furthermore the use of log-transformed value 
facilitating the measure of proportionate effects of variables on compensation through the 
regression coefficients rather than the dollar value effect as would otherwise be the case in 
non-log transformed compensation data. 
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5.1.2  Measures of institutional quality 
The quality of the institutions is measured using the World Bank Governance Indicators 
(2011), developed by Kaufman et al (2009).  These are a set of six indices that capture 
aspects of state-level institutions and citizens’ perceptions of them.  These were first 
constructed in 1996, then updated every two years until 2002 and annual thereafter.  The 
indicators are compiled from the responses on the quality of governance obtained from 35 
data sources in 33 organizations and  are drawn from a large sample of firms, citizens and 
experts in industrial and emerging countries, with added information from institutes, think 
tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations (Kaufman et al, 
2009).  The six indicators are constructed using an unobserved components methodology 
(see Kaufman et al (2009), with values ranging from approximately -2.5 to +2.5 and where 
higher values denote better governance outcomes. 
The six governance indices are defined by the World Bank (World Bank Governance 
website, 2011) as follows: 
 
Control of Corruption –capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
capture of the state by elites and private interests 
Government Effectiveness –capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism –capturing perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism 
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Regulatory Quality –capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development 
Rule of Law – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
Voice and Accountability –capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media 
 
5.1.3  Control Variables 
Board controls:  All board controls are drawn from prescriptions of the agency perspective.  
As such we use four controls.  Board size, defined as total number of executive and 
nonexecutive directors in unitary split board systems, or number of nonexecutive directors 
plus members of executive management committee in supervisory two-tier board systems.  
This follows the literature that suggests that larger boards are more difficult to coordinate and 
there is less effective communication between directors, resulting in greater dominance by 
the CEO or insider groups (Boyd (1994); Yermack (1996)).  Board independence ratio is the 
proportion of nonexecutive directors to total board size, as defined above.  However while 
this measure is a common control in agency literature it is limited in not distinguishing 
between insider-associated and outsider, or independent, nonexecutives and their levels of 
personal stock ownership, if any.  This motivates the construction and use of the next two 
controls.  Ratio true independence measures the proportion of outside nonexecutive directors 
to total board size.  Finally ratio of nonexecutives owning more than 2% stock issued by firm 
to total board size provides an indication of nonexecutives that have significant personal 
ownership stakes in focal firm.  The value of 2% is reduced from the 5% stock ownership 
 22 
value for which shareholders must be reported as block-holders in US SEC filings in the light 
of weaker disclosure and regulatory requirements across Africa than the US market. 
 
Economic determinants:  Three economic determinant controls are used.  The first is the 
natural logarithm of firm revenues in year preceding IPO.  Rosen (1982) and Smith and 
Watts (1992) ascribe higher firm revenues to firms that are larger and in having greater 
economic growth opportunities inferring more complex task environments for directors.  The 
second is return on assets (ROA) measured in terms of accounting earnings before tax on 
total asset value, with both denominated in US$ and measured in year preceding IPO.  This 
provides a measure of firm operating performance.  The final control is natural logarithm of 
firm age, measured in years from IPO year to year of establishment of firm.  This provides an 
indication of risk with younger firms having less operating history possessing more risk than 
their counterparts with well-established trading histories. 
 
Ownership controls:  Three ownership control categories are used to control for the impact of 
different types of block-holder in terms of concentration of cash flow rights pre-IPO.  These 
are corporate block entities, family and state.  This last category of owner is prevalent in 
partial privatizations that are prevalent across North Africa involving a long term foreign 
partner gradually absorbing the shareholding divested by state entities. 
 
5.2  Methods 
5.2.1  Board compensation 
Estimation is by pooled ordinary least squares.  In each case the six World Bank institutional 
quality index measures are recursively added to the base model that is composed only of the 
controls. 
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with subscripts i for firm level, j for country level variables and t for time period.  Country 
fixed effects are used across all models in preference to using additional (1/0) dummy 
controls.  All institutional quality variables and controls are defined above. 
 
5.2.2  Likelihood of individual executive pay disclosure 
Logistic (Logit) regressions are developed with the dependent variable being dichotomous 
taking the value of 1 for disclosure of individual executive salary and 0 otherwise.  This takes 
the form: 
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with subscripts i for firm level, j for country level variables and t for time period and where 
all board governance, economic determinant and control variables are defined in previous 
section. 
 
6.  Results 
6.1  Descriptive statistics and correlations 
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The evidence from Table 2 reveals that there is considerable dispersion in both board 
compensation as well as disclosure of individual executive salary both within and between 
North Africa’s IPO markets.  This is reflected in terms of a range of country-mean base 
salary from US$ 38,850 in Algeria to US$ 138,353,750 in Egypt while intra-country standard 
deviations are routinely as high or higher than the aggregate mean levels themselves.  This is 
likely reflective of the wide variety in types of firm listing on these markets ranging from 
those participant to family networks to former SOE’s.  There is equally a significant increase 
from board base salary to aggregate board total remuneration although it is notable the largest 
increases are in Algeria and Egypt.  This was also indicated earlier from Figure 1 in terms of 
differences between family and non-family firms.  Finally there is a considerable dispersion 
in individual executive salary disclosures with this ranging from 52% of IPO prospectuses in 
Tunisia to 3% in Morocco.  It is also notable that while intra-country standard deviations are 
high between Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia that these are extremely low in Morocco which 
would indicate a paucity in informational environment in Morocco. 
 The dispersion across the six World Bank governance indices between the four North 
African markets is also considerable and ranges from Tunisia with the highest level of 
institutional quality to Algeria with the weakest.  It is also notable that Egypt and Algeria 
both rank very poorly in terms of corruption control and voice and accountability measures. 
Table 2 
 
6.2  Regression results 
Evidence from correlation analysis reveals minimal levels of correlation and equally minimal 
statistical significance attached to these, mitigating concerns over potential multicollinearity1.  
However the large and significant correlations between all six of the World Bank governance 
measures necessitates their consideration within a separate context with their individual 
recursive addition into models.  The application of country-level fixed effects accounts for 
                                                 
1 Pearson correlation tables are available from author upon request 
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latent institutional differences across the four North African markets where despite all 
sharing French civil code law legal and governmental institutions there remain significant 
differences.  These are exemplified by Morocco and Algeria in particular having followed 
dirigiste (state-led) economic governance model while Egypt was heavily influenced by 
socialist nationalization policies of Abdel Nasser which have only been reversed since late 
1990’s. 
 The evidence from Tables 3 and 4 reveal substantial support for hypothesis H2a in 
terms of a large, negative coefficient of association between government effectiveness and 
board base salary (-9.366) and board total remuneration (-11.566) which is statistically 
significant at 99-95% confidence margin.  In addition there is partial support for hypothesis 
H1a relating corruption control to both compensation measures.  This partial support arises 
from a large, negative (-6.500) relationship between board base salary and government 
effectiveness which is statistically significant at 95% confidence margin.  However there is a 
considerable decrease in absolute size of the coefficient between total remuneration and 
government effectiveness while this lacks statistical significance at any discernible 
confidence level.  These results are in line with very recent literature on institutional 
determinants of board remuneration in West Africa in Hearn (2013c).  A notable unexpected 
result is the large, positive coefficient between rule of law and total remuneration (+6.848) 
which is statistically significant at 90% confidence margin.  There is no precedent in 
literature to explain this finding.  However a plausible explanation relates to bureaucratically 
and operationally efficient legal process and court operation within a civil code law system 
that through promoting the subordination of individual to centralized notion of state authority 
in effect acts to support a crony-capitalist system.  As such enhanced rule of law institutional 
quality in developing country civil code law settings that are dominated by extended families 
and business groups operating on a crony basis are more supportive of centralized state 
authority and thus potential expropriation.  In this light the large, positive association 
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between rule of law and board total remuneration (our measure of expropriation) is a 
plausible outcome. 
 There are generally similar relationships between controls and both compensation 
measures.  In particular there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
board size and both compensation measures.  While this is in part a function of the higher the 
number of directors then the greater the aggregate compensation it is importantly a reflection 
on larger boards being less effective governance instruments.  Both Boyd (1994) and 
Yermack (1996) ascribe larger boards to having poorer communication between members 
and a greater propensity for domination by dominant insider groups (or CEO) with 
consequent increased likelihood of expropriation.  Other notable relationships are a large 
positive association between ratio of independent nonexecutives and both compensation 
measures while a similarly sized but negative relationship exists with the ratio of 
nonexecutives that have personal ownership stakes in excess of 2%.  Hearn (2013c) finds a 
similar relationship in West Africa and ascribes this to the lack of recourse, influence and 
effective monitoring ability of independent nonexecutives inferring apathy in tackling board 
self-reward tendencies.  The opposite is likely to be true of nonexecutives with an ownership 
stake in excess of 2% as by virtue of their personal ownership they are able to exert effective 
monitoring through enhanced voting rights and control.  In terms of firm controls and it is 
notable that a large positive and statistically significant association exists between firm 
performance (proxied by ROA) and the total remuneration compensation measure.  While 
this lacks statistical significance in terms of base salary it infers that expropriation is more 
likely in high performance firm.  This line of reasoning can be extended in terms of firms 
participant to large extended family networks, which themselves have greater separation 
between ownership and control (Claessens et al, 2000) are more likely to benefit from that 
group affiliation in terms of coordination of resources within network which is reflected in 
higher performance, while at same time being vulnerable to expropriation precisely by same 
mechanism of separation of ownership from control.  Finally there is a positive association 
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between concentrated family ownership and both compensation measures.  However while 
there is a similarly sized positive relationship between state ownership and base salary this is 
reversed in direction (becomes negative) for total remuneration measure. 
Tables 3 and 4 
 
6.3  Logistic regression results for likelihood of disclosure 
The institutional determinants of expropriation of protection of informational property rights 
for minority investors is revealed in Table 5.  The findings support hypothesis H3b through a 
large, negative coefficient (+6.101) that is statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
between political stability and likelihood of disclosure.  However the very large negative 
coefficient (-13.363) that is statistically significant at 99-95% confidence margin between 
voice and accountability and likelihood of disclosure is the opposite of postulated 
relationship in hypothesis H6b.  The most likely explanation for this sizeable negative 
relationship is based on the premise that firms seeking to raise external finance in countries 
characterised by very weak independent media, paucity in democratic freedoms of 
association and governments lacking in broad constituency are more likely to adopt 
international best practice corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure to counter for 
these state-level institutional deficiencies (see Dyck and Zingales (2004)). 
 In terms of controls and there is a greater likelihood of disclosure with smaller boards 
while these are composed of higher proportions of nonexecutives with personal share 
ownership in excess of 2%.  Disclosure is also more likely in underperforming firms (with 
lower ROA) while disclosure is equally twice as likely with increased concentrated 
ownership by corporate block-holders and three times more likely with concentrated 
ownership of state. 
Table 5 
 
7.  Discussion and Conclusions 
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This study elaborates on the institutional determinants of expropriation in terms of two board 
compensation measures and disclosure of individual executive salaries in IPO listings 
prospectuses.  The two measures of salary are fixed base salary and total remuneration which 
takes into account base salary, additional perks and allowances, dividend income and any 
income derived from bonuses, derivative ownership and director level income derived from 
affiliated firms under the control of focal IPO firm. 
 Using a unique hand-collected and comprehensive sample of IPO firms from across 
North African equity markets of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt from 2000 to 2012 I 
find evidence that government effectiveness is inversely related to board compensation.  In 
addition corruption control is inversely related to aggregate board base salary while a 
surprising finding is enhanced rule of law is associated with increased board total 
remuneration.  Finally I find evidence that increasing political stability is associated with 
enhanced likelihood of disclosure of individual executive salaries while voice and 
accountability has a large inverse relationship with likelihood of disclosure.  This is infers 
that firms in poor informational environments are more likely to have elevated levels of 
transparency in relation to board income, salary and compensation practices. 
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Table 1. Number of IPOs in North Africa by market 
IPO activity, by market, from across North African region between 2000 and 2012. 
Year Total Algeria Egypt Tunisia Morocco 
 Marché 
principal 
Marché 
développement 
Marché 
croissance 
2000 5 3* 1 -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- 
2001 6 -- -- -- -- 4 -- -- 2 -- -- 
2002 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2003 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2004 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- 2 -- -- -- -- 
2005 10 -- -- 3 4 2 1 -- -- 
2006 13 -- -- 1 2 4 3 3 
2007 15 -- -- 2 4 5 3 1 
2008 10 -- -- 2 2 4 2 -- -- 
2009 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2010 8 -- -- 1 4 3 -- -- -- -- 
2011 5 1 -- -- 1 3 -- -- -- -- 
2012 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total: 78 4 10 25 24 11 4 
Note: * includes IPO listing from 1999/1998 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for director remuneration and disclosure across North Africa 
Descriptive statistics for sample of 78 North African IPO firms.  Board base salary (the fixed value is reported in IPO listings prospectus per director) and the conservative 
estimate of board total remuneration (estimated using Forbes Billionaire methodology (Forbes Billionaire, 2011)) are delineated in US$ thousands.  Disclosure is a dummy 
variable taking value 1 if individual CEO salary is disclosed in IPO listings prospectus and 0 otherwise.  Country level averages of World Bank Governance institutional quality 
indices.  These are the six corruption control, government effectiveness in implementation of policies promoting private sector development, political stability and absence from 
terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law and democratic voice and accountability indices (developed by Kaufman et al (2009)) across all markets.  Indicators 1 to 6 have been 
rescaled on a 0-1 scale. 
  Board Base Salary (US$ ‘000) Board Total Remuneration (US$ ‘000) Disclosure (1/0) 
 NTotal Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Algeria 4 38.85 23.64 219,190.10 438,281.59 0.25 0.50 
Egypt 10 138,353.75 323,122.69 455,662.15 1,020,348.50 0.30 0.48 
Morocco 39 655.10 516.76 1,182.78 1,289.34 0.03 0.16 
Tunisia 25 3,123.89 8,206.09 5,206.81 8,813.56 0.52 0.51 
        
  Corrupt Control Effective 
Government 
Political Stability Regulatory Quality Rule of law Voice & 
Accountability 
 NFamily Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Algeria 1 0.239 0.333 0.274 0.363 0.294 0.235 
Egypt 6 0.286 0.414 0.527 0.494 0.534 0.290 
Morocco 23 0.356 0.466 0.555 0.528 0.518 0.390 
Tunisia 14 0.408 0.590 0.677 0.556 0.563 0.298 
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Table 3. The impact of external institutional quality on board remuneration (base salary) 
Regression models are pooled cross section OLS regressions relating control variables and board characteristics to director remuneration.  The six institutional quality measures are 
World Bank Governance measures as developed in Kaufman et al (2006), namely institutional quality indices for corruption control, effective government, political stability, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability and an aggregate measure of all six indices.  Board controls are board size, defined as total number of directors (namely both 
executives and nonexecutives). Board independence ratio is proportion of nonexecutives to total board size.  Economic determinants are natural logarithm of firm revenues in year 
preceding IPO and ROA, defined as accounting returns (net income) divided by total assets value in year preceding IPO.  Ownership controls are level of ownership (percent) prior 
to IPO for corporate block shareholder, state and family entities.  The data have been sourced manually from the last prospectus lodged with the relevant securities exchange or 
national regulator immediately prior to listing. 
 Log (Board base salary) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 1.568 [1.56]* 3.584 [2.43] † 6.039 [2.39] † 1.601 [0.83] 0.457 [0.20] 0.602 [0.30] 2.486 [2.30]** 
Institutional Quality        
H1a: Corrupt Control  -6.50 [-2.13]**      
H2a: Government Effectiveness   -9.366 [-1.74]**     
H3a: Political Stability    -0.069 [-0.02]    
H4a: Regulatory Quality     2.170 [0.63]   
H5a: Rule of law      1.981 [0.64]  
H6a: Voice & Accountability       -2.112 [-0.76] 
Board Controls        
Board Size 0.059 [2.50] † 0.054 [2.27]** 0.044 [1.95]** 0.059 [2.58] †† 0.060 [2.54] † 0.061 [2.63] †† 0.058 [2.58] †† 
Board Ind. Ratio -0.032 [-0.07] -0.013 [-0.03] -0.269 [-0.66] -0.032 [-0.07] -0.054 [-0.12] -0.023 [-0.05] 0.054 [0.13] 
Ratio Independent Nonexecutives 1.310 [1.68]** 1.390 [2.03]** 1.451 [1.95]** 1.313 [1.67]** 1.241 [1.61]* 1.289 [1.61]* 1.338 [1.79]** 
Ratio Nonexecutives own>2pc -1.830 [-1.28]* -1.799 [-1.32]* -2.102 [-1.40]* -1.830 [-1.28]* -1.852 [-1.30]* -1.947 [-1.32]* -2.193 [-1.54]* 
Economic Determinants        
Log (Revenue) 0.037 [0.16] 0.074 [0.33] 0.086 [0.44] 0.038 [0.18] 0.029 [0.12] 0.021 [0.09] -0.023 [-0.11] 
ROA -0.439 [-0.71] -0.081 [-0.13] 0.127 [0.21] -0.434 [-0.60] -0.283 [-0.40] -0.603 [-0.83] -0.241 [-0.37] 
Ownership        
Corp. Block Own 0.003 [0.71] 0.004 [1.13] 0.003 [0.75] 0.003 [0.71] 0.003 [0.73] 0.002 [0.59] 0.002 [0.45] 
Family Own 0.004 [1.46]* 0.005 [2.06]** 0.005 [1.80]** 0.004 [1.45]* 0.004 [1.47]* 0.004 [1.42]* 0.004 [1.52]* 
State Own 0.004 [1.12] 0.006 [1.48]* 0.005 [1.31]* 0.004 [1.14] 0.005 [1.28]* 0.004 [1.11] 0.005 [1.38]* 
        
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 4.79 [0.00] 4.82 [0.00] 5.54 [0.00] 4.34 [0.00] 4.39 [0.00] 4.39 [0.00] 4.51 [0.00] 
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Adjusted R2 0.4079 0.4292 0.4718 0.3968 0.4007 0.4003 0.4085 
Change R2 (over control variables only)  0.0213 0.0639 -0.0111 -0.0072 -0.0076 0.0006 
Notes: (1) T-statistics are in parentheses (2) White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.01 level 
†† Significant at the 0.005 level 
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Table 4. The impact of external institutional quality on board remuneration (total remuneration) 
Regression models are pooled cross section OLS regressions relating control variables and board characteristics to director remuneration.  Institutional quality, board governance, 
economic determinants and ownership variables are as defined in Table 3. 
 Log (Board total remuneration) 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Intercept 1.395 [1.46]* 1.420 [0.84] 6.917 [3.75] †† 0.516 [0.24] 2.330 [1.17] -1.942 [-0.77] 0.927 [0.71] 
Institutional Quality        
H1a: Corrupt Control  -0.080 [-0.03]      
H2a: Government Effectiveness   -11.566 [-3.06] ††     
H3a: Political Stability    1.853 [0.59]    
H4a: Regulatory Quality     -1.824 [-0.50]   
H5a: Rule of law      6.848 [1.53]*  
H6a: Voice & Accountability       1.076 [0.44] 
Board Controls        
Board Size 0.066 [2.19]** 0.066 [2.16]** 0.048 [1.48]* 0.070 [2.39] † 0.066 [2.14]** 0.075 [2.65] † 0.067 [2.15]** 
Board Ind. Ratio -0.049 [-0.11] -0.049 [-0.11] -0.341 [-0.77] -0.057 [-0.12] -0.031 [-0.07] -0.017 [-0.04] -0.094 [-0.22] 
Ratio Ind Nonexecutives 0.810 [1.58]* 0.811 [1.58]* 0.983 [1.81]** 0.740 [1.50]* 0.868 [1.60]* 0.736 [1.43]* 0.796 [1.49]* 
Ratio Nonexec own>2pc -1.831 [-1.47]* -1.831 [-1.45]* -2.167 [-1.82]** -1.821 [-1.47]* -1.813 [-1.48]* -2.235 [-1.66]* -1.646 [-1.28]* 
Economic Determinants        
Log (Revenue) 0.132 [0.56] 0.133 [0.58] 0.193 [0.97] 0.091 [0.43] 0.139 [0.59] 0.077 [0.34] 0.163 [0.73] 
ROA 2.223 [2.06]** 2.228 [2.04]** 2.923 [2.78] †† 2.079 [1.94]** 2.092 [2.03]** 1.657 [1.54]* 2.122 [2.05]** 
Ownership        
Corp. Block Own -0.001 [-0.34] -0.001 [-0.33] -0.001 [-0.30] -0.001 [-0.35] -0.001 [-0.34] -0.003 [-0.66] -0.001 [-0.20] 
Family Own 0.004 [1.47]* 0.004 [1.42]* 0.005 [1.83]** 0.004 [1.43]* 0.004 [1.43]* 0.004 [1.45]* 0.004 [1.41]* 
State Own -0.007 [-1.28]* -0.007 [-1.20] -0.007 [-1.18] -0.007 [-1.28]* -0.008 [-1.28]* -0.007 [-1.31]* -0.008 [-1.36]* 
        
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.20 [0.00] 4.71 [0.00] 6.33 [0.00] 4.78 [0.00] 4.74 [0.00] 5.23 [0.00] 4.74 [0.00] 
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Adjusted R2 0.4327 0.4220 0.5120 0.4267 0.4242 0.4543 0.4244 
Change R2 (over control variables only)  -0.0107 0.0793 -0.0060 -0.0085 0.0216 -0.0083 
Notes: (1) T-statistics are in parentheses (2) White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.01 level 
†† Significant at the 0.005 level 
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Table 5. The impact of board characteristics on likelihood of individual salary disclosure 
Logistic regression models are relating control variables and board characteristics to the likelihood of disclosure of individual executive director salary.  Institutional quality, board 
governance, economic determinants and ownership variables are as defined in Table 3. 
 Likelihood of disclosure of individual salary 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Intercept 5.051 [2.34] † 4.678 [1.21] 2.547 [0.71] 1.620 [0.51] 0.892 [0.16] 0.697 [0.15] 10.499 [2.57] †† 
Institutional Quality        
H1b: Corrupt Control  0.968 [0.11]      
H2b: Government Effectiveness   4.023 [0.78]     
H3b: Political Stability    6.101 [1.39]*    
H4b: Regulatory Quality     8.258 [0.78]   
H5b: Rule of law      9.49 [1.07]  
H6b: Voice & Accountability       -13.633 [-2.32] † 
Board Controls        
Board Size -0.420 [-3.20] †† -0.417 [-3.14] †† -0.398 [-2.98] †† -0.412 [-2.76] †† -0.444 [-3.12] †† -0.399 [-2.68] †† -0.382 [-2.92] †† 
Board Ind. Ratio -0.026 [-0.02] -0.062 [-0.04] -0.016 [-0.01] -0.197 [-0.14] -0.064 [-0.04] -0.277 [-0.20] 0.444 [0.31] 
Ratio Ind. Nonexecutives -0.440 [-0.19] -0.354 [-0.15] -0.105 [-0.05] 0.199 [0.09] -0.089 [-0.04] 0.373 [0.16] 0.489 [0.23] 
Ratio Nonexec own>2pc 8.165 [1.79]** 8.105 [1.76]** 7.566 [1.63]* 7.064 [1.49]* 7.657 [1.68]** 6.886 [1.44]* 4.401 [0.95] 
Economic Determinants        
Log (Revenue) -0.385 [-0.85] -0.387 [-0.85] -0.358 [-0.77] -0.496 [-1.03] -0.422 [-0.91] -0.626 [-1.28]* -0.801 [-1.13] 
ROA -21.401 [-3.18] †† -21.135 [-2.99] †† -20.299 [-2.90] †† -20.89 [-2.99] †† -22.991 [-3.38] †† -22.757 [-3.39] †† -24.247 [-3.39] †† 
Ownership        
Corp. Block Own 0.020 [1.28]* 0.019 [1.17] 0.020 [1.28]* 0.021 [1.33]* 0.020 [1.29]* 0.019 [1.19] 0.024 [1.72]** 
Family Own 0.007 [0.76] 0.007 [0.75] 0.007 [0.72] 0.008 [0.77] 0.009 [0.86] 0.010 [0.99] 0.014 [1.16] 
State Own 0.017 [1.14] 0.018 [1.14] 0.021 [1.34]* 0.030 [1.75]** 0.028 [1.44]* 0.032 [1.95]** 0.013 [0.63] 
        
No Obs. = 0 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
No Obs. = 1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
No. Obs. 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
LR statistic (prob.) 29.22 [0.00] 29.25 [0.00] 29.95 [0.00] 31.57 [0.00] 29.77 [0.00] 31.24 [0.00] 35.93 [0.00] 
McFadden R2 0.3512 0.3515 0.3599 0.3794 0.3577 0.3755 0.4318 
Notes: (1) Z-statistics are in parentheses (2) QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.01 level 
†† Significant at the 0.005 level 
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Figure 1.  Comparison of board base salary and remuneration-based private benefits of control (in US$) across North African markets 
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Source: IPO listing prospectuses and authors own calculations 
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Appendix Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of Family controlled IPO firms 
Table detailing family controlled firms across Maghreb region with respective gross amounts raised from IPO together with director base salary and total remuneration values.  These 
are defined in Table 2. 
 Family IPO Firm Industry Gross 
Proceed 
(US$ ‘000) 
Family 
Own Pre-
IPO (%) 
Family 
Own Post-
IPO (%) 
Board Base 
Salary 
(US$ ‘000) 
Board Total 
Rem. 
(US$ ‘000) 
Algeria Khelifati Alliance Assurances Finance 27,465.90 98.00 67.53 7.49 876,612.48 
         
Egypt Sawiris Orascom Telecom Holding 
ةضباقلا ايجولونكتلاو ملاعلااو تلااصتلال موكساروأ 
Telecommunications 312,300.00 100.00 55.15 330.00 10,074.17 
 Talaat Moustafa Talaat Moustafa Group 
ةضباقلا ىفطصم تعلط ةعومجم 
Real Estate 418,200.00 47.30 42.30 17,300.00 26,660.73 
 Sadek and 
Ghabbour 
Ghabbour Auto 
وتوا ىب ىج 
Car Distribution 846,000.00 86.60 63.40 976,821.00 989,596.32 
 Arafa Al Arafa Investments and Consultancies 
تاراشتسلااو تارامثتسلال ةفرعلا 
Real Estate 15,916.40 75.60 67.00 230,028.00 3,035,944.59 
 Eleish; Zeid; 
Nadim 
Maridive and Oil Services 
 ةيلورتبلاو ةيحلاملا تامدخلا- فياديرام  
Oil services 41,488.20 39.60 29.46 -- -- -- -- 
 Thabet Juhayna 
ةيئاذغلا تاعانصلل ةنيهج 
Food Manufacture 193,400.00 51.20 36.70 2,244.03 4,975.38 
         
Morocco Alj Groupe Unimer 
ريمينوأ 
Fishing 5,800.95 99.70 79.80 155.10 440.04 
 Tazi Société de Therapeutique Marocaine 
اميطوس 
Pharmaceutical 
Distribution 
12,693.40 74.98 62.77 1,042.97 1,042.97 
 Khalil Dari Couspate 
طابسوك يراد 
Food Machinery 3,469.53 98.00 69.10 -- -- -- -- 
 Sefrioui Douja Prom Addoha 
ىحضلا ةعومجم ىجد 
Technology 324,872.00 95.00 61.75 750.43 750.43 
 Debbargh Cartier Saada 
ةداعس يتراك 
Distribution 2,609.20 63.00 43.70 -- -- -- -- 
 Benjelloun Distrisoft Maroc SA Office Machinery Import 
and Distribution 
7,692.44 30.60 21.70 417.23 771.10 
 Chaabi Société Nationale d’Electrolyse et de Pétrochimie 
تايواميكورتيبلل ةينطولا ةكرشلا 
Chemical Manufacture 
and Production 
123,408.00 100.00 65.00 634.67 2,515.18 
 Puech Transport International Maroc 
راميت 
Transport 1,851.12 100.00 76.92 264.08 333.77 
 Benjelloun Salafin Finance 32,259.50 92.80 74.50 469.15 469.15 
 Bensaleh Compagnie d’Assurances et de Réassurances 
اطنلطأ 
Finance 141,845.00 59.92 42.92 1,075.81 1,813.10 
 Amor Microdata 
اتادوركيم 
Technology 14,216.60 100.00 70.00 537.90 865.76 
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 Family IPO Firm Industry Gross 
Proceed 
(US$ ‘000) 
Family 
Own Pre-
IPO (%) 
Family 
Own Post-
IPO (%) 
Board Base 
Salary 
(US$ ‘000) 
Board Total 
Rem. 
(US$ ‘000) 
 Mernissi Société de Promotion Pharmaceutique de Maghreb 
لإا ةكرش برغملل يلديصلا شاعن- مرافومورب  
Pharmaceutical 
Distribution 
27,930.20 79.85 54.50 870.89 1,204.00 
 Alj Stockvis 
ايقيرفأ لامش سيفكوتس 
Industrial 12,752.50 89.28 71.42 609.62 801.67 
 Lazraq Alliances Développement Immobilier 
سنايلأ 
Tourism 234,684.00 82.64 60.13 680.63 5,674.33 
 Fahim Delta Holding 
غنيدلوه اتلد 
Technology 110,292.00 71.78 64.74 703.86 703.86 
 Alj; Bennani Label Vie – Hyper 
 ليبلايڤ  
Conglomerate 61,601.10 89.45 71.57 859.58 859.58 
 Bennis Trarem Afrique S.A Office Machinery Import 
and Distribution 
11,811.90 100.00 61.03 421.07 421.07 
 Bouveur Delattre Levivier Maroc Construction 10,710.10 79.99 63.99 635.47 848.66 
 El Alami CNIA SAADA Assurance Finance 74,832.50 91.46 76.46 2,495.57 6,021.18 
 El Alami Société Afric Industries SA Industrial 3,085.78 84.80 57.11 31.34 146.00 
 Rtabi JET ALU Maroc S.A Industrial 27,201.60 53.56 42.32 105.39 1,435.79 
 Hamdi Ennakl Automobiles SA Transport 22,281.70 99.99 59.99 189.88 1,230.76 
 Ziatt Société de Travaux de Réalisation d’Ouvrages et de 
Construction Industrielle 
Construction 11,912.30 100.00 76.90 717.28 718.73 
         
Tunisia Bayahi Tunisie Profilés Aluminium 
موينميللأا تابنجمل سنوت 
Metals Manufacture 16,284.30 100.00 83.89 1,033.28 2,961.81 
 El Materi Société Adwya 
ةيودأ 
Pharmaceutical 
Distribution 
6,179.98 98.40 68.40 2,680.76 13,612.76 
 Mzabi Automobile Reseau Tunisien et Services 
تامدخلا و تارايسلل ةيسنوتلا ةكبشلا 
Car Distribution 64,215.40 99.95 69.78 379.96 16,397.06 
 Ben Ayed Poulina Group Holding 
ةضباقلا انيلوب 
Industrial 80,118.30 96.02 86.13 33,657.10 33,657.10 
 Hachicha Société Electrostar 
راتسورتكلإ 
Technology 6,058.16 100.00 70.00 657.73 657.73 
 Kallel L’Accumulateur Assad 
دسأ ةيسنوتلا ةيراطبلا 
Battery Production and 
Distribution 
20,045.20 77.90 56.50 259.24 644.85 
 Djerbi Société Generale Industrielle de Filtration 
يفاصملل ةماعلا ةيعانصلا 
Car Distribution 4,038.37 79.99 68.25 386.50 698.03 
 Ben Amor Karthago Airlines Transport 4,652.67 79.50 63.60 202.00 1,357.03 
 Lahmar Société de production Agricole Teboulba 
ةبلبطب يحلافلا جاتنلاا 
Food Processing 4,644.72 100.00 73.86 121.20 121.20 
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 Family IPO Firm Industry Gross 
Proceed 
(US$ ‘000) 
Family 
Own Pre-
IPO (%) 
Family 
Own Post-
IPO (%) 
Board Base 
Salary 
(US$ ‘000) 
Board Total 
Rem. 
(US$ ‘000) 
 Abdennadher Société Moderne de Céramiques 
فزخلل ةيرصعلا 
Household goods 15,149.10 76.08 66.57 260.58 1,080.25 
 Arem Société Tunisienne d’Equipement 
زيهجتلل ةيسنوتلا 
Vehicle spare parts 1,442.77 100.00 73.50 -- -- -- -- 
 Loukil Les Ateliers Mechaniques du Sahel (AMS) Vehicle spare parts 6,345.98 64.40 45.80 141.57 7,524.49 
 Hidoussi Hexabyte 
تيابيزكإ 
Technology 1,269.20 71.28 59.87 15,871.40 15,871.40 
         
   Disclosure (%) Gross 
Proceed 
(US$ ‘000) 
Family 
Own Pre-
IPO (%) 
Family 
Own Post-
IPO (%) 
Board Base 
Salary 
(US$ ‘000) 
Board Total 
Rem. 
(US$ ‘000) 
  Mean: Family Firms 20.45% 76,615.60 84.16 62.50 32,402.80 126,689.41 
  Mean: Non-Family Firms* 26.47% 295,979.52 0.98 0.81 1,167.02 1,869.26 
Source: Compiled by authors from IPO listings prospectuses lodged with stock exchanges and national regulators prior to listing 
Notes: * indicates mean non-family firm as reference only.  Individual non-family firm data is not reported here for brevity. 
 
